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After Debt: A Path Forward for 
Puerto Rico
David A. Skeel
Over the last decade, recession has plagued the economy of Puerto Rico—a 
Commonwealth territory of the United States—and the island has increased 
its public debt by an unmanageable amount in order to balance budgets and 
provide necessary services.
A lack of economic opportunity, which compelled many 
of the territory’s citizens to move to the U.S. mainland 
or to leave the labor force altogether, worsened the dire 
fiscal state of the island, which receives federal revenues 
but does not collect federal income taxes from its resi-
dents (see Figures 1 and 2). 
As of April 2016, Puerto Rico has amassed roughly 
$72-73 billion in debt and is unable to meet its pay-
ment obligations, to say nothing of its $44 billion in 
unfunded pension liabilities. The Commonwealth has a 
debt-to-income ratio in excess of 100 percent.1 Puerto 
Rico’s municipalities, including its public utility com-
panies, owe much of this debt to creditors comprising, 
in large part, U.S.-based mutual funds and hedge funds. 
A significant portion of Puerto Rico’s debt, however, is 
attributable to the territory itself in the form of general 
obligation (GO) bonds (see Figure 3). 
Not even the island’s largest creditors know exactly 
which parts of the Commonwealth are responsible for 
which debts, and Puerto Rico has complicated matters 
further by using funds appropriated to various govern-
ment agencies to pay its guaranteed GO debt. Neces-
sarily, this has involved further cuts to government 
SUMMARY
• This Issue Brief summarizes events surrounding the current 
debt crisis in Puerto Rico and presents a two-step plan for 
restructuring Puerto Rico’s debt and encouraging more effec-
tive governance. This plan draws extensively on the previous 
experiences of debt crises in municipalities on the U.S. mainland.
•  Step one entails the creation of a financial control board (FCB) 
for Puerto Rico, monitored by the U.S. federal government but 
involving significant Puerto Rican representation, which would 
terminate its active role in Puerto Rico’s affairs once fiscal 
benchmarks are established and satisfied. This FCB needs to 
have more authority than envisioned in the proposal by Senate 
Democrats, but less than that recommended in draft legislation 
from House Republicans.
• Step two would be for Congress either to craft a restructuring 
framework applicable to all of America’s territories, or to extend 
the existing bankruptcy laws in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code (with modifications) to Puerto Rico and its municipalities.
• Together, these two steps would remove the risk that Puerto 
Rico will pick and choose which obligations to pay and ensure 
that creditors’ priorities will be honored—all the while avoiding 
a true taxpayer-funded bailout. But Congress must act quickly.
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services, exacerbating the population 
exodus. Unlike municipalities (e.g., 
Detroit) that are hampered by severe 
debt and economic stagnation and 
reside within the U.S. states, Puerto 
Rican municipalities cannot declare 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy to restructure 
their debt obligations because Puerto 
Rico’s municipalities (along with 
Washington, D.C.) were excluded 
from Chapter 9 by a 1984 amendment 
to the Bankruptcy Code. Yet a federal 
appellate court held that the Com-
monwealth must abide by Chapter 9 
restrictions that apply to all U.S. states 
and which prohibit debt restructuring 
outside of bankruptcy. Lacking obvi-
ous means for sufficient fiscal reform, 
the island has taken matters into its 
own hands.
In this Issue Brief, I will sum-
marize the recent events surround-
ing the debt crisis in Puerto Rico. I 
will then present a two-step plan for 
restructuring Puerto Rico’s debt and 
encouraging more effective gover-
nance in a manner that, on the one 
hand, promotes the island’s demo-
cratically elected authority and, on the 
other hand, addresses concerns that 
any federal intervention constitutes a 
“bailout.” 2
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE 
TERRITORY
In January 2016, Puerto Rico missed 
a second consecutive debt payment, 
as it was unable to meet all of its 
interest rate obligations. Despite the 
territory’s heralded inability to satisfy 
future interest payments on its debt, 
including $422 million in payments 
due in May and $2 billion in July, 
Congress has been slow to take action. 
Draft legislation from Republicans 
in the House Committee on Natural 
Resources, which has jurisdiction over 
all U.S. territories, has stoked sharp 
criticism from the Commonwealth. 
An earlier Senate bill proposed by 
Democratic Senator Bob Menendez 
(D-NJ) received a more favorable 
reception from Puerto Rico, but was 
strongly criticized by Congressional 
Republicans. 
Sensing a threat to its democrati-
cally elected authority, and uncertain 
whether Congress will act, the Com-
monwealth demonstrated its indepen-
dence by passing legislation permit-
ting Puerto Rico’s governor to impose 
a moratorium on any debt payments 
through the beginning of 2017 while 
 1  For comparison, this is well above the maximum 60 percent 
level that the EU requires of its members.
 2  The recommendations in this Issue Brief come from Clayton 
P. Gillette and David A. Skeel, Jr., “A Two-Step Plan for Puer-
to Rico”, Institute for Law and Economics, U. Penn. 16-3 
(2016). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2728466.
 3  For more information on this proposal, see Reuters, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-puertorico-debt-idUSKC-
N0X81MY.
 4  See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust vs. Puerto Rico, 805 
F.3d 322 (1st Circuit 2015) for the case that struck down 
the Recovery Act.
 5  For discussion of the various forms and roles of financial 
control boards, see Clayton P. Gillette, “Dictatorships for 
Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities”, 114 
Columbia Law Review, 1373 (2014).
 6  Some of the entities that have issued debt in Puerto Rico, 
and there are at least 18 of them, might not qualify as 
“municipalities” and some might not meet Chapter 9’s insol-
vency requirement. These include the Government Develop-
ment Bank, which serves as the Commonwealth’s fiscal 
agent, Prepa, the public electricity company, and COFINA, a 
conduit for the issuance of bonds secured by sales taxes.
 7  Clayton P. Gillette and David A. Skeel, Jr., “Governance 
Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy”, Yale 
Law Journal (2016).
 8  Professors Mitu Gulati and Robert Rasmussen have argued 
that Puerto Rico’s creditors are subject to an implied duty of 
good faith that could be used to catalyze a voluntary restruc-
turing.  Mitu Gulati & Robert Rasmussen, “Puerto Rico—
NOTES
FIGURE 1: PUERTO RICO’S GNP, DEBT, AND POPULATION
Source: Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico
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simultaneously extending a relief 
proposal of its own to creditors. 
Specifically, Puerto Rico would like to 
cut down the debt that is directly or 
indirectly owed by the territory, about 
$49-50 billion, through new public 
debt offerings, in a direct appeal to 
creditors who fear that the alternatives 
(i.e., Congressional legislation or law-
suits filed by the creditors themselves 
against the territory for breaching 
debt contracts) could lead to worse 
repayment outcomes.3 The problem 
here is that, even if most bondholders 
favor this non-bankruptcy restructur-
ing, any restructuring arrangement 
without a majority voting provision is 
not binding on bondholders who do 
not consent—and there could be a lot 
of them.
As for the remainder of the debt, 
most of which belongs to public 
utility companies, the Common-
wealth attempted to establish grounds 
for restructuring that portion via 
bankruptcy-like proceedings when 
it passed a 2014 law known as the 
Recovery Act. The legality of the leg-
islation was challenged and, initially, 
opposing creditors won rulings in fed-
eral trial and appellate courts to halt 
the law’s implementation.4 However, 
the Supreme Court surprised both the 
Commonwealth and its creditors by 
deciding to take the case. The Court 
heard oral arguments in late March, 
signaling that the future of the Recov-
ery Act, and what its restructuring 
capabilities could mean for the rest  
of Puerto Rico’s public debt, is far 
from certain. 
Although Puerto Rico’s creditors 
would welcome a financial control 
board (FCB), they have lobbied 
aggressively against proposals to 
create a bankruptcy or other federal 
restructuring option for Puerto Rico, 
especially proposals that would extend 
both to Puerto Rico’s municipalities 
and to the territory itself. Creditors 
that are willing to at least consider a 
restructuring option insist that it rely 
entirely on majority voting by each 
class of creditors, and that a restruc-
turing not be “crammed down” on any 
class of creditors that votes against it.
Congressional relief for the ter-
ritory has proponents and critics in 
both political parties and for differ-
ent reasons. What is clear is that any 
rescue measure—extending Chapter 9, 
developing a territory-specific solu-
tion, or otherwise—must address the 
full burden of Puerto Rico’s debt. At 
best, it also would assist in correcting 
the larger problem of dysfunctional 
governance on the island. While 
Puerto Rico may not want limits on 
its democratically elected authority, 
as called for in the bills proposed by 
the Senate and the House Committee 
on Natural Resources, the Common-
wealth remains unable to grow its way 
out of debt, and thus far, it has given 
no indication that it can navigate its 
current economic challenges or avoid 
similar ones in the future. Some finan-
cial controls are warranted, but the 
details matter a lot.
STEP ONE: AN EFFECTIVE 
FINANCIAL CONTROL BOARD
Financial control boards serve the 
purpose of restructuring democratic 
processes that have failed to provide 
services that are desired (or needed) 
by constituents at a tax price that 
induces residents and firms to remain. 
A properly designed FCB that has 
authority over Puerto Rico’s budgets 
and related issues can play a criti-
cal role in the rehabilitation of the 
territory’s distressed government. An 
FCB can provide expertise to officials, 
assurances to capital markets, and a 
way to overcome political obstacles to 
financial reform that elected officials 
might find unattractive. In constrain-
ing the authority of elected officials, 
the FCB further addresses the moral 
hazard of local overspending that can 
Debtor, Heal Thyself,” FT Alphaville, Jan. 14, 2016, available 
at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/01/14/2148906/guest-
post-puerto-rico-debtor-heal-thyself.
NOTES 
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precede requests for financial relief 
from the federal government. 
For an FCB in Puerto Rico to 
be effective, it must have significant 
Puerto Rican representation, but 
Congress must establish it and set 
its parameters. This approach has 
worked to overcome severe financial 
distress in major municipalities on the 
U.S. mainland, especially in the cases 
of New York City in the 1970s and 
Washington, DC in the 1990s.5 An 
FCB augments, rather than replaces, 
elected officials. If designed appropri-
ately, it only minimally will disrupt 
democratic processes and it will with-
draw as soon as the controlled entity 
(i.e., Puerto Rico) satisfies objective 
benchmarks consistent with financial 
stability. Here is a summary of what it 
should look like:
APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS
President Obama, after consultation 
with the Chair of the House Com-
mittee on Natural Resources, currently 
Rep. Rob Bishop (R-UT), and the 
Resident Commissioner for Puerto 
Rico in the House of Representa-
tives, Pedro Pierluisi, would make the 
following appointments to a seven-
member board.
• Two ex-officio members: Governor 
Garcia Padilla of Puerto Rico and 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Jack 
Lew
•  Three of five voting members from 
Puerto Rico, giving Puerto Rico 
majority representation on the board
•  Two of five voting members from 
the private sector, providing sub-
stantial experience in budgeting, 
public debt, and capital markets
The inclusion of the Puerto Rican 
Governor provides legitimacy to the 
FCB, and it also allows him to benefit 
from the expertise of the other mem-
bers of the board. The presence of the 
U.S. Treasury Secretary or his desig-
nate ensures representation of federal 
interests in the fiscal health of the U.S. 
territory. All seven appointments find 
precedence in state FCBs.
POWERS OF THE BOARD
1. The FCB should have the author-
ity to negotiate with creditors and 
enter into binding debt adjustment 
agreements, once the board is able 
independently to determine and 
provide transparent and credible 
portrayals of Puerto Rico’s current 
financial situation.
2. The control board should be given 
both authority and funding to com-
mission and review audits of Puerto 
Rico or any of its municipalities and 
affiliated entities.
3. The FCB should be able to approve 
or disapprove annual budgets and 
five-year plans, the latter of which 
it would commission. Such plans 
increase transparency by providing 
benchmarks against which actual 
spending can be measured. After the 
FCB withdraws, benchmarks will 
be necessary for observing devia-
tions in expenditures. However, the 
FCB would not be permitted to 
determine spending priorities within 
a balanced budget, as that would 
undermine the authority of demo-
cratically elected officials.
4. Board approval should be required 
for all substantial contracts, includ-
ing collective bargaining agreements 
with public service unions.
5. The FCB should have authority to 
approve or disapprove any new debt 
issuances.
6. While the FCB should not replace 
elected officials, as was done in 
Detroit, the FCB could ensure fiscal 
prudence by receiving and disburs-
ing all revenues that would flow 
to the Commonwealth. This finds 
precedence in New York City and 
FIGURE 2: LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE
Source: Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Washington, DC control boards. 
The capturing of revenues may be 
politically infeasible, but disburse-
ment capability during a control 
period is beneficial even by itself.
7. The board should impose “best prac-
tices” for budgeting and account-
ing, as well as sanctions, including 
removal, against officials who violate 
its orders or policies.
TERMINATION AND REINSTATEMENT 
OF BOARD
The FCB would terminate its active 
management role in the Common-
wealth once fiscal benchmarks are 
established and satisfied. It would, 
however, reassert an active role if  
deficits or other specified signs of 
crisis returned.
STEP TWO: A 
RESTRUCTURING LAW FOR 
U.S. TERRITORIES—NOT 
JUST PUERTO RICO
The discipline provided by an FCB, 
though critical, will not be enough 
to alleviate Puerto Rico’s financial 
distress. A second step is required. 
Congress either should give Puerto 
Rico and its municipalities access to 
the existing municipal bankruptcy 
laws in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, or it should craft an alterna-
tive restructuring framework for all 
of America’s territories. A sufficient 
rescue package could utilize either 
approach, but the latter option is 
preferable because it naturally takes 
into account the idiosyncrasies of ter-
ritories and it maintains key distinc-
tions between them and the states. 
Congress’s authority to enact a new 
restructuring law would come from the 
Territories Clause in Article IV of the 
U.S. Constitution and the Bankruptcy 
Clause in Article I.
Regardless of approach, both 
the territories themselves and their 
municipalities should be eligible for 
relief, meaning Chapter 9 would 
need to be amended to include both 
the territory and its municipalities if 
Congress selects that option. Only 
allowing municipalities to restructure 
their debts, as the case of Puerto Rico 
shows, ignores large portions of gov-
ernment debt owed directly or indi-
rectly by the territory itself (roughly 
$50 billion with Puerto Rico), which 
could prevent a territory from return-
ing to fiscal health.6 Such an approach 
is not available to U.S. states, as only 
their municipalities have recourse to 
bankruptcy and not the state itself. 
Crafting a solution applicable exclu-
sively to territories in order to address 
the crisis in Puerto Rico, therefore, 
would signal to states that they should 
not expect similar treatment, and it 
would assuage any concerns that the 
law is not “uniform,” as required by 
the Bankruptcy Clause.
The Puerto Rican Governor 
and the FCB each should be given 
independent authority to invoke the 
new law. If the territory itself files to 
initiate restructuring and meets the 
law’s entrance requirements, any of 
its municipalities or affiliated entities 
should be permitted to file as well, 
and the latter group should not be 
subject to the insolvency requirement 
(see Footnote 6). Per the Bankruptcy 
Code, all of these entities need to be 
treated separately, but the option to 
develop a single reorganization plan 
should remain on the table.
KEY PROVISIONS OF TRADITIONAL 
BANKRUPTCY TO INCORPORATE 
INTO A NEW RESTRUCTURING LAW
1. Impose an automatic stay on litiga-
tion to prevent creditors from “rac-
ing to the courthouse.” Puerto Rico 
already faces a growing number of 
costly lawsuits due to its missed  
debt payments.
2. Ensure that a majority vote binds 
each class of creditors.
FIGURE 3: BREAKDOWN OF PUERTO RICAN DEBT
Source: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Financial Information and Operating Data Report, November 2015
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3. Provide the right to assume desir-
able contracts and terminate unde-
sirable contracts, with some special 
restrictions regarding collective 
bargaining agreements.
4. Allow financing to be provided 
by public or private entities. There 
need not be a designated source 
of public funding akin to what the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandates 
for systemically important financial 
institutions.
5. Creditors must be protected by 
definitions of “unfair discrimination” 
and “best interests” in order to avoid 
another Detroit scenario. The rule 
of law took a beating in the Detroit 
bankruptcy. Creditors who held that 
city’s GO bonds, which had the 
same priority as pensions, received 
only about 41 percent of what they 
were owed, and several classes of 
creditors that voted against the plan 
received far less. Pensioners, mean-
while, received 60-70 percent. To 
protect the future investment poten-
tial of Puerto Rico, Congress should 
explicitly require that recovery rates 
for creditors with the same priority 
cannot deviate more than a specified 
amount, such as 15 or 20 percent. 
This would be a way to “discrimi-
nate fairly.” Additionally, Congress 
should define “best interests” to 
mean that a restructuring plan 
guarantees as much recovery for 
creditors as is reasonably possible, as 
opposed to the “something’s better 
than nothing” ruling handed down 
in Detroit.
6. The “feasibility” requirement should 
include governance reform. Bank-
ruptcy courts should decline to 
approve a restructuring plan as 
feasible if it does not address obvi-
ous governance dysfunction that is 
frequently a primary cause of fiscal 
distress.7 Puerto Rico exemplifies 
this dysfunction, as about 120 gov-
ernment agencies provide services 
on the island with insufficient 
centralization to avoid overlap and 
to coordinate responsibilities. A plan 
that fails to eliminate or consolidate 
government agencies should be 
rejected as not “feasible.”
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
AND ALTERNATIVE 
OUTCOMES
The two steps of this plan are closely 
connected. Of particular importance 
is the authority given to the FCB 
to initiate the restructuring process. 
However, as comprehensive as this 
plan may be, Puerto Rico still needs 
a larger plan for future economic 
growth. The Commonwealth clearly 
would benefit from federal correc-
tion to some harmful economic 
constraints, like the artificial restric-
tion on Medicaid reimbursements for 
territories. Another often-mentioned 
source of relief would be a relaxation 
of the federal minimum wage require-
ment, which is relatively high for the 
Puerto Rican economy. This idea has 
found favor among some economists 
in both political parties. 
MORATORIUM AND VOLUNTARY 
RESTRUCTURING
Absent Congressional action, Puerto 
Rico could use its moratorium author-
ity to halt payment on some or all of 
its future debt payments through early 
2017 to give itself breathing room 
while coordinating debt restructuring 
with creditors outside of bankruptcy 
via new debt issues. Some creditors 
have offered their own proposals 
already. For this to be successful, an 
overwhelming number of creditors 
would need to support the strategy 
and withhold lawsuits. Averse to 
the presence of a control board, the 
Commonwealth is attempting to 
orchestrate this scenario presently. 
Some commentators have argued that 
Puerto Rico could draw on existing 
law to force its creditors to negoti-
ate in good faith.8 But it is not clear 
whether or not this ad hoc restructur-
ing strategy is a viable course.
RECOVERY ACT RESURRECTION
The Supreme Court could rule in 
favor of the Commonwealth and 
reassert the validity of the Recovery 
Act, which would allow Puerto Rico 
to restructure the debt belonging to 
its public utility companies ($22-23 
billion). Such a ruling certainly would 
be appealed, likely for violating the 
Contracts Clause of both the Puerto 
Rican and U.S. Constitutions, and it 
could take many years for the island to 
implement the Act in any way.
A TAXPAYER-FUNDED BAILOUT
A true bailout might be demanded 
from U.S. taxpayers if Congress does 
nothing and Puerto Rico is unable to 
work out new arrangements with its 
creditors to write down some of its 
current debt. Since it is now clear that 
the territory is insolvent (and facing 
costly lawsuits from some creditors), 
the debt crisis could evolve into a 
humanitarian crisis if the island is 
forced to default outright (i.e., runs 
out of cash entirely). The Government 
Development Bank already has been 
reduced to a “bridge bank” simply for 
7
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
financing essential public services, and 
it is rapidly exhausting its capital.
 
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy or a territorial restructur-
ing law can mitigate Puerto Rico’s 
debt problems, so long as terms like 
“unfair discrimination,” “best inter-
ests,” and “feasibility” are properly 
defined in response to recent rul-
ings on municipal bankruptcies. The 
financial control board and restruc-
turing law for territories proposed in 
this Issue Brief draw extensively on 
the experience of other debt crises in 
U.S. municipalities, such as those in 
New York City and Detroit. These two 
steps remove the risk that Puerto Rico 
will pick and choose which obliga-
tions to pay, and they ensure that 
creditors’ priorities will be honored. 
An FCB would augment elected lead-
ership and correct broken democratic 
processes, while bankruptcy law would 
avoid the need for a true taxpayer-
funded bailout. 
This plan will only work if Puerto 
Rico addresses its dysfunctional 
governmental structures and receives 
federal policy support for overcoming 
its long-lasting recession and popula-
tion flight. Relative to the proposal 
from Senate Democrats, this plan calls 
for an FCB with greater oversight 
and decision-making authority. And 
compared to the Republican draft 
legislation from the House, which in 
its initial form gave too much power 
to the FCB, this plan provides a 
more balanced approach. There is a 
path forward for Puerto Rico, but it 
requires Congress to act this year.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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